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MEDIAN VOTER MODEL CANNOT SOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS 
OF VOTING SYSTEM 
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i) A country where fewer weapons are legal. For example where the semi-automatic gun 
is the most dangerous legal weapon. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The median voter theorem is one of the most prominent results of formal political theory and economics, and is 
widely used to study interactions between them. The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution 
on the single dimension and is a more accurate predictor of decision outcomes under simple majority voting 
system. Politicians believe that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections 
less than the other models and an attempt has been taken to explore these in some details. Although the median 
voting model plays a pioneer role in modern democracy but it can not solve all the problems of voting system, 
and the paper deals where the median voter theorem fails. 
Keywords: Median voter, Single-peakedness, Single-crossing and Top monotonicity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The method of majority voting prevailed before the dawn of recorded history but the concept 
of median voter theorem (MVT) came from the Duncan Black (1948). Greek Philosopher 
Aristotle in 330 B.C. wrote ‘Analysis of Political Decision Making’. French political 
philosopher and mathematician Marquis de Condorcet gave the idea of pivotal voter. But 
neither Aristotle nor Condorcet gave any information about the median voter and we had to 
wait Black’s work on majority voting which was given in 1948. Black’s MVT states that, “If 
all voters’ preferences are single-peaked on a single dimension then the bliss point of the 
median voter is a Condorcet winner”. This important result has been crucial in the 
development of public economics and political economy. If an alternative beats every other 
alternative in sequence of pair-wise majority contests then it is called Condorcet winner.  
In voting system every voter’s preference ordering i.e., the preference profile, taken 
collectively, form the input, the output is usually a single certain winner or a set of winners. 
The methods of transforming preference profiles into winners; i.e., mappings from the set of 
possible preference profiles into the set of alternatives is called voting procedures. For each 
preference profile the mapping produces a single winning alternative. In political economics 
such a mapping is called a social decision function.  
Voting equilibria does not exist when in majority voting paradox arises. Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem is one of the predictions of voting difficulties (Islam 1997, 2008, Islam 
et al. 2009 a, b). In median voter model there is a Condorcet winner which is an equilibrium 
outcome.  
An agent’s bliss point is ideal point in policy space. If any agent moves away from the ‘bliss 
point’ he must move away to a less preferred policy i.e., his utility declines monotonically as 
policy moves away from it. For example, one voter’s ideal point might be a country where 
people are allowed to own any weapon up to and including a pistol.  This voter would be less 
happy in both:  
ii) A country where more weapons are legal. For example artillery, tanks, nuclear bombs 
are legal weapons. 
Or a voter’s ideal point could be a country with a 10 % tax rate.  This voter would be less 
happy in both: 
1Emeritus Professor, Research Centre for Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh. Phone: 
+880-31-616780. 
2 Assistant Professor, Premier University, Chittagong, Bangladesh. E-mail: haradhan_km@yahoo.com 
3 Professor, Paññāsāstra University of Cambodia, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. E-mail: pahlajmoolio@gmail.com 
Jamal Nazrul Islam, Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, Pahlaj Moolio, 
Int. J. Eco. Res., 2011 2(6), 111-125 ISSN: 2229-6158
IJER | NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 2011 
Available online@www.ijeronline.com
111
i) A country where taxes are higher, so that the voters have more services, but they are not 
worth the taxes. 
ii) A country where taxes are lower, so that the voters have more earnings after-tax 
income, but the service cuts are not worth it. 
All preferences have not “single-peaked”. For example, consider a wealthy father.  If 
spending on education is high, he sends his sons to public university.  But otherwise he sends 
them to private university, and gets no benefit from education spending.  So his preferences 
would look like this: 
pick 1: high spending,  
pick 2: low spending,  
pick 3: medium spending. 
The median voter is the person in the middle of the distribution on the single dimension. A 
Condorcet winner is the alternative that beats all others in pair-wise majority votes and is 
named after the French political philosopher Marquis de Condorcet (1943-1994). In this 
paper the concept of Median Voter is described following Black (1948, 1958), Rothstein 
(1990), Gans and Smart (1994), Myerson (1996), Klaus et al. (1997), Klaus (2001), 
Conglaton (2004), Saporiti and Thome (2006), Barbera and Moreno (2008), Saporiti (2008), 
Penn et al. (2008), Manjunath (2009), Barbera (2010) and Islam et al. (2011).   
Assume that voters’ preferences are “single-peaked”.  Suppose we have a two-party election. 
Voters’ care about and are perfectly informed about party positions on exactly one issue: A 
vs. B. The electoral rule is “winner-takes-all”- whoever gets more votes wins. Both of them 
want to win, and care more about that than everything else put together. The two parties 
compete in exactly one way: By taking a stand on the issue. The electorate may be divided 
into three groups: those who definitely vote for the more A party, those who definitely vote 
for the more B party, and the people in the middle, who pick whichever party is closer to 
them. In equilibrium, parties’ platforms cannot be different, because both parties gain votes 
by moving closer to each other. One party would get more than 50% of the votes by moving a 
little closer to the median. The equilibrium platform is the median of the distribution. If both 
parties are at the median, then staying there gets 50% of the votes, but moving a little to the 
left or right gets fewer than 50%.  
In the U.S.A. 2007 national election the Democrat leader Barack Obama won with the favor 
of median voters. Obama promised for a change in the country which was in favor of the 
median voters. Also in Bangladesh in the 2008 national election Great Alliance won by 
applying the same strategy. Hence median voters’ policy is effective in many situations.  
Here we have discussed relatively simple models of voting system but the real political 
settings are more complex than the models seem to imply (Congleton 2004). We used simple 
model basically for three reasons namely, i) simple models allow knowledge to be transferred 
from person to person than those of more complex models, ii) simple models provide us some 
clear knowledge of voting whereas complex models do not always provide so, iii) from 
simple models we, the common people, can understand the main features of the voting 
system which is a theme of democracy.  
The paper is exposition of median voting system. Borda (1781), Condorcet (1785), (both are 
French political philosophers and mathematicians) and even many modern politicians believe 
that elections are logically imperfect. Median voting model has such imperfections less than 
the other models and in this paper we will explore these in some details. Recently median 
voter’s model have been developed for the median voter’s demand for other forms of 
regulation, for public goods and services for national and defense by changing the constraints 
to fit the policy of interest.  
In a strategic voting system the bureaucrats may manipulate voters by appropriately 
subsidizing various kinds of information and act counter to median voter interests where the 
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median voter is unlikely to be well informed. The MVT may not hold if voters do not have 
single-peaked preferences. Then Condorcet cycle (Islam et al. 2011) arises and violates the 
MVT. 
In median voter model individuals are anonymous, unanimous and non-dictatorial. They are 
anonymous, because the names of the individuals play no role in taking social choices. They 
are unanimous, since they respect any unanimous consensus in the society about the most 
preferred alternative. Every strategy-proof social choice rule is dictatorial i.e. there is an 
individual whose preferences always dictate the final choice regardless of other individuals’ 
preferences. So that in median voter model each individual must be non-dictatorial.  
Recent studies show that the median voter model can explain federal, state, and local 
spending, as well as international tariff policies. The median voter model appears to be quite 
robust as a model of public policy formation in areas where the median voter can credibly be 
thought to understand and care about public policy. Finally we may say that the median voter 
model can serve as a very useful first approximation of governance within democratic 
policies. 
The paper is organized as follows:  
In section II we briefly give the basic concept of who is (are) median voter(s) with simple 
examples following Conglaton (2004). Here we define weak and strong form MVT and show 
that in both cases median voter gains.  
In section III we have discussed main portion of the median voter model. Here we describe 
single-peakedness, single-dippedness, single-crossing by introducing diagrams where 
necessary [for detail see Black 1948 and 1958, Gans and Smart 1994, Myerson 1996, Klaus 
et al. 1997, Klaus 2001, Conglaton 2004, Ballester and Haeringer 2006, Saporiti and Thome 
2006, Barbera and Moreno 2008,  Penn et al. 2008, Sapority 2008, Manjunath 2009, Barbera 
2010 and Islam et al. 2011]. In section IV we introduce top-monotonicity following Barbera 
and Moreno (2008) by weakening the notion of single-peakedness about indifferences by 
considering that there are more individuals which are indifference then majority rule may 
destroy but yet there exists Condorcet winner. Here we include some definitions and 
examples to clarify the concept of top-monotonicity. Section V is limitation of the median 
voter model where we show that MVT can not solve every problems of voting system (Islam 
et al. 2011) and final section VI gives concluding remarks.  
 
BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE MEDIAN VOTER  
We consider, three individuals A, B, C visited the U.S.A. from Bangladesh. They had to stay 
in a residential hotel, A chose a hotel which cost $1000, B chose a hotel which cost $1500 and 
C chose a luxurious hotel which cost $3000 per night. We can say B as a median voter, since 
exactly the same number of individuals prefer a more expensive hotel than B and as prefer a 
less expensive hotel than B, of course here one each (Conglaton 2004).  
The weak form of the MVT says that the median voter casts his vote in favor of the outcome 
that wins in the election. We can explain the weak form of the median voter as follows: Let 
us consider there are two candidates in the election. If voters cast their votes to the candidate 
who is closed to the median voter always wins the election. As a result the winning candidate 
always receives the vote of the median voter i.e., the weak form of the MVT is satisfied.  
The strong form of the MVT says that the median voter always gets his most preferred 
policy. We can explain strong form of MVT as follows: If both candidates compete to find 
the favor of the median voter, the positions of both candidates converge towards the policy 
positions that maximize the median voter’s welfare. In this case both candidates may get 
equal number of votes. It is no matter which candidate wins in the election in this limiting 
case but the median voter gains what the candidates promise in the election i.e., the strong 
form of the MVT will hold for national public choices.  
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Although the median voter model implies that the median voter gets what he wants but in 
some cases gains depend on the usual Paretian sense of welfare economics. In an electoral 
contest between two candidates if a median voter exists government policy will maximize the 
welfare of the median voter in equilibrium. As a result median voter plays a pioneer role in 
modern democracy. 
 
MATHEMATICAL DISCUSSION OF MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 
Notations 
Let { }nN ...,2,1 =  be the set of individuals or voters which is finite subset of the non-
negative real line +R and ( ) 2# >= nN  is odd. The set of alternatives or social options is 
denoted by { },...,, zyxY = . In this section and throughout the paper we consider each voter 
ranks the list of candidates in order of preference i.e., for three candidates x, y and z the 
preference profile of a voter may be as follows:  
1.  x 
2.  y 
3.  z. 
Here x is one’s first choice, y is second choice and z is third choice. For convenience, we will 
use this profile as, xPyPz. Let ( )NYP  be the set of binary relations which is complete, 
transitive and anti-symmetric binary preferences on Y. Let ( )NYPP∈  be the preference 
ordering over the elements of Y. For any pair Yyx ∈, , xPy denotes the strict preference for x 
against y. Here Y is complete, transitive and anti-symmetric i.e., for Yyx ∈, completeness 
implies xPy or yPx such that yx ≠ , transitivity implies if xPy, yPz then xPz and anti-
symmetry implies xPy or yPx such that x = y. Let L denote any linear order over Y. Two 
alternatives x and y are consecutive in L if xLy or yLx and there exists no alternative z such 
that xLzLy or yLzLx. For any set YA ⊆  the least preferred alternative of Ni∈  on A with 
preference relation iP  is denoted by  
( ) { }{ }xyPxAyxPAl iii , \: , ∈∀= . 
We define ( ) ( ) ( )iiNi PAlAlPAl ,, ∈∪== . Similarly we define the most preferred alternative in 
A as, 
( ) { }{ }yxPxAyxPAm iii , \:, ∈∀= . 
So that  
( ) ( ) ( )iiNi PAmAmPAm ,, ∈∪== .  
Single-peakedness, Single-dippedness and Single-crossing 
We have two basic versions of the MVT: (i) Single-peaked preference (Black 1958) and (ii) 
Single-crossing property (Gans and Smart 1994). Now we briefly discuss these following 
Arrow (1963), Myerson (1996), Ballester and Haeringer (2006), Saporiti and Thome (2006), 
Barbera and Moreno (2008), Saporiti (2008) and Penn et al. (2008). These two versions are 
as follows:  
Single-peakedness 
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were 
used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of 
cycles according to the majority rule. A set of preference relations is single-peaked if there is 
linear order of the alternatives such that every preference relation has a unique most preferred 
alternative or ideal point, over this ordering, and the preference for any other alternatives  
monotonically decreases by moving away from the ideal point.  
Single-peaked preferences usually come in economics when a strictly quasi-concave utility 
function on a linear budget set is maximized. In spatial modeling there might be either single 
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or multiple dimensions. In single dimension consider political terms of a Left-Right 
ideological dimension which is represented by a single line pictured as in Figure 1 with five 
points (x, y, z, u and v) are marked on it. Consider these to be ideal or bliss points of five 
voters. For all Yyx ∈, , we may write yx <  to mean that x is left to y in the spatial voting 
model. According to MVT  ‘z’ is a winner.  
 
•               •               •                •                 •  
L                    x                y                z                 u                  v                   R 
Figure 1.  Five voters’ ideal points on a single dimension. 
 
Now consider three voters  1V , 2V  ,and  3V . Let their ideal points marked on the x-axis and 
their utilities on the y-axis as in Figure 2. The utility of each voter depends from their ideal 
point which gives a single peak for each voter. Therefore they have a single-peaked of the 
preferences. Single-peakedness is the oldest and probably the best known restriction on 
individuals’ preferences guaranteeing the existence of voting equilibria (Black 1958).  
Now we can define (Ballester and Haeringer 2006) single-peaked preference as follows:  
 
               Utility 
 
                                                                 2V                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
                          1V  
                                          
                                                                                                      
                             3V                                                                         
                              
                                                                                                         
                                   
        
                                                 •                  •               •                                                                                                                                   
                 L                               x                  y                 z                                   R                                                     
             
Figure 2.  Single-peaked preferences. 
 
Definition 1: A preference profile P is single-picked if there exists a linear order L such that 
for each individual Ni∈ , and any two alternatives Yyx ∈, , ( )LxLyYmi  or ( )YyLxLmi  
imply yxPi . 
Definition 2: Given a preference relation iP  and a set YA ⊆ , a linear order L over A is an 
admissible orientation of A with respect to iP  if for any triple of alternatives of A; ( )Ami , x 
and y such that ( )LxLyAmi  or ( )AyLxLmi , we have yxPi . 
Let L ( )ii PA,  be the set of all linear orders that are admissible orientations of A with respect 
to iP  and L ( )PA,  =L (A )= Ni∈∩ L ( )ii PA,  be the set of all linear orders that are admissible 
orientations for all individuals. 
Definition 3: A profile of preferences P is single-picked if L ( )PY , φ≠ . We can also define 
(Myerson 1996) single-peaked as follows: Let for each voter i, it is assumed that there is 
some ideal point Yp∈  such that for every Yyx ∈, if yxpi <≤  or ipxy ≤<  then, 
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( ) ( )yuxu ii > , where ( ) ( )ni xxxuxu ,...,, 21=  is the utility function of the individual i (Islam 
1997, 2008, Islam et al. 2009a, b). We observed that on either side of ip , voter i always 
prefers alternatives that are closer to ip . This is called the single-peakedness assumption. 
Now assume that the number of voters is odd, the median voter’s ideal point is the alternative 
*p  such that, 
{ }*:  #
2
# ppiN i <≥   and  { }ippiN <≥ *:  #2
# . 
The voters who have ideal points at *p and to its left form a majority that prefers *p over any 
alternative to the right of *p , while the voters who have ideal points at *p and to its right 
form a majority that prefers *p  over any alternative to the left of *p . So the median voter’s 
ideal point *p  is a Condorcet winner in Y.  
 
Single-dipped Preferences 
Single-dipped (or single-caved) preferences usually arise in public good situations which 
indicate that each agent has a worst share, below which and above which her preference 
increases. For example, consider two types of work which have negative cross effects like; 
perhaps, teaching and management in a university: combinations of the two types of work 
may be less preferred than pure one-type tasks. We will discuss briefly single-dipped 
preferences following   Klaus et al. (1997), Klaus (2001), Manjunath (2009) and Barbera 
(2010).   
Let us consider a set of agents  { }nN ,...,2 ,1=  and a complete binary relation iR  for each 
Ni∈ , on [0, K] where +ℜ∈K . Single-dippedness of iR  means that there exists a point 
( ) [ ]KRd i ,0∈ , the dip of agent i, such that for all [ ]Kyx ,0, ∈  with ( )iRdyx ≤<  or 
( )iRdyx ≥>  we have yxPi  (Figure  3 ).  
 
   
   
                                        R 
                                                 •        •       •  
                               0                d         y       x        K 
Figure 3.  Single-dipped preference relation ( ) [ ]KRd i ,0∈ , where xPy. 
 
 
 
    
                                               d                   d  
                                                    •        •  
                             0                       x        y                          K 
Figure 4. The preference relation in the enlarged domain troughR , where [ ]ddyx ,, ∈ ,  xIy. 
 
A natural enlargement of the domain of single-dipped preferences is the set of single-
troughed preferences, troughR , such that the set of least preferred points is an interval. Now 
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troughRR∈  if there is an interval [ ] [ ]Kdd ,0, ⊆  such that for each [ ]Kyx ,0, ∈ , if dyx ≤<  or 
xyd <≤  then xPy and if [ ]ddyx ,, ∈ , then xIy (Figure  4 ). 
Sometimes the preference relation of an agent may be indifferent between 0 and K but it may 
happen that she prefers near 0 to near K (Figure  5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           •  
  0                                   d           K 
Figure  5.  Single-dipped preferences over a convex frontier. 
 
Single-crossing Property 
For Yyx ∈, , we may write yx <  to mean that x is left to y in the spatial voting model. Let 
the voters’ preferences are transitive ordered in some political spectrum say from leftist to 
rightist (Myerson 1996). We mean ji <  that voter i is to the left of voter j in this political 
spectrum. For any two voters i and  j such that ji < , for any two policy alternatives x and y 
such that yx < ,  
if ( ) ( )yuxu ii <  then ( ) ( )yuxu jj <  
but if ( ) ( )yuxu jj <  then  ( ) ( )yuxu ii < . 
This assumption is called the single-crossing (SC) property. Single-crossing does not exclude 
individuals’ preferences but which do not monotonically decrease on both sides of the ideal 
point as single-peakedness does.  
We can also define an easier way single-crossing as follows (Saporiti 2008): Let  > is linear 
order  of Y and   is a linear order of  single-crossing , and ( )NYPSC ⊂ . For all Yyx ∈,  and 
for all SCPP ∈′,  the single-crossing property indicates,  
[ ] xPyyPxPPxy ′⇒′> &  ,   & [ ] xPyyPxPPxy ⇒′′> &  ,    . 
Saporiti (2008, p 3) gave two examples of single-crossing as follows:  
“Suppose a moderately rich individual prefers a high tax rate to another relatively smaller tax 
rate, so that he reveals a preference for a greater redistribution of income. Then, the single-
crossing property requires that a relatively poorer individual, who receives a higher benefit 
from redistribution, also prefers the higher tax rate. Sometimes this is interpreted in the 
literature by saying that there is a complementary between income and taxation, in the sense 
that lower incomes increase the incremental benefit of greater tax rates. For another example, 
consider a strong army which prefers a large territorial concession and a small probability of 
war to a small concession and a high probability of war. Then, under single-crossing, with a 
lower expected payoff from war, should also prefer the large concession”. 
If the number of voters is odd and their order is complete and transitive, then there is some 
median voter M such that   
{ } { }jMNjMiNi <∈=<∈ : #: # .  
For any pair of alternatives Yyx ∈,  such that yx < , if the median voter M prefers x then all 
voters to the left of the median voter agree with him, but if the median voter prefers y then all 
the voters to the right of the median voter agree with him. In both cases majority grows where 
median voter supports. Hence, the alternative that is the most preferred by the median voter 
must be a Condorcet winner.  
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Let YT ⊆  be a triple that contains three distinct alternatives (say x, y, z). Now we define 
order-restriction (OR) as follows (Rothstein 1990): 
 
Order restriction 
If B and C be sets of integers, let B >> C means that every element of B is greater than every 
element of C. A preference profile R is order-restricted on A iff there is a permutation 
NN →:π such that for all distinct Nyx ∈, ,  
( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ } :  :  : xyPiyxIiyxPi iii πππ >>>> , 
or 
( ){ } ( ){ } ( ){ } :  :  : xyPiyxIiyxPi iii πππ <<<< . 
In preference relation we can state two conditions as follows (Rothstein 1990): 
1) to group together all people who strictly prefer x to y, all who are indifferent, and all who 
strictly prefer y to x; and 
2) to place these groups in order of strict preference, indifference; and strict reverse 
preference. 
Now we set an example following Rothstein (1990) as follows: 
Example 1:  Let { }zyxT ,,= be a triple. The preference relation being as follows:  
zyPxP 11 , 
zyIxP 22 , 
xzPyP 33 . 
In this arrangement { }yx,  and { }zx,  satisfy condition (1) but { }zy,  does not.  Now let the 
preference relation be as follows: 
zyIxP 11 , 
zyPxP 22 , 
xzPyP 33 . 
Here conditions (1) and (2) are met. Hence the preference family is order-restricted on T. 
Now we define value restriction (VR) as follows (Sen 1970): 
Value-restriction 
In a triple T there is some alternative, say x, such that all the concerned individuals 
(individuals who are not indifferent) agree that it is not worst, or agree that it is not best, or 
agree that it is not medium i.e. for all concerned i ; 
                                    VR(1): ( )zxPyxPNi ii ∨∈∀ ;  
                                      or 
                                    VR(2): ( )xzPxyPNi ii ∨∈∀ ;  
                                      or 
            VR(3): ( ) ( )( )xzPxyPzxPyxPNi iiii &&; ∨∈∀ . 
Here VR(1) states that x is never on the bottom, or “not worst,” and VR(2) states that x is “not 
best,” and VR(3) states that x is “not medium” . Sen (1970) proved that VR(1) is equivalent to 
single-peakedness on T and VR(2) is equivalent to single-dippedness on T. Let { } NiiR ∈  denote 
the entire family of preference relations, Rothstein (1990) proved the following theorems: 
Theorem 1: Given { } NiiR ∈ , and T a triple in Y, 
                   (a) If preferences satisfy OR then they satisfy VR. 
                   (b) The converse of (a) is false. 
Theorem 2: Given { } NiiR ∈ , and T a triple in Y, 
                   (a) If preferences satisfy VR(1) or VR(2) then they satisfy OR. 
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                   (b) The converse of (a) is false. 
Theorem 3: Given { } NiiR ∈ , and T a triple in Y, if all individuals have strict preferences for 
every pair, then preferences satisfy VR(1) or VR(2) if and only if they satisfy OR. 
Theorem 1 states OR is strictly stronger than VR. Theorem 2 states that OR is strictly weaker 
than single-peakedness or single-dippedness. Theorem 3 states that on triples OR is 
equivalent to single-peakedness and single-dippedness when individual indifference is not 
allowed. 
 
ANALYSIS OF TOP-MONOTONICITY 
For all Ni∈  for any YA ⊂  we denote by ( )Ati  the set of maximal elements of iR  on A. So 
that ( ) { }AyyxRAxAt ii ∈∀∈=   ,: . We call ( )Ati  the top of i in A. When ( )Ati  is a singleton, 
( )Ati  will be called individual i’s peak on  A.  
Single-peakedness requires each individual to have a unique maximal element. For any 
individual, any alternative x to the right of its peak is preferred to any other that is further to 
the right of it and similar case for any alternative y to the left of its peak. As a result no 
individual is indifferent between two alternatives on the same side of its peak. Indifference 
classes may consist of at most two alternatives, one to the right and one to the left of the 
individual’s peak. 
Now if we will weaken the notion of single-peakedness about indifferences by considering 
that there are more individuals which are indifference then majority rule may destroy. But 
good news is that in this case does not create any cycle and yet Condorcet winner exists. 
Before define top-monotonicity (Barbera and Moreno 2008) first we define these types of 
preferences such as single-plateaued and order-restricted preferences as follows: 
 
Single-plateaued 
A preference profile P is single-plateaued iff there exists a linear order > of the set of 
alternatives such that; 
a) the set of alternatives in the top of each of the voters is an interval  
( )Ati = [ ( ) ( )ApAp ii +−  , ] relative to >, called the plateau of i, and 
b) for all Ni∈ , for all ( )Ati , and for all Azy ∈,  
[ ( ) ( )ApyzApyz ii +− ≥>≤< or  ] zyPi⇒ . 
Top-monotonicity is a weakening condition than single-peakedness and single-plateauedness. 
In this situation we yet can say that Condorcet winners exist under single-peakedness 
preferences, and that they coincide with the median(s) of the distribution of the voters’ peaks.  
We see that single-peakedness and order-restriction are equivalent and have been proven by 
Gans and Smart (1996). Now we are in a position to define top-monotonicity condition.  
 
Top-monotonicity 
A preference profile R is top-monotonic iff there exists a linear order > of the set of the 
alternatives, such that for all YA∈  for all Nji ∈, , all ( )Atx i∈ , all ( )Aty j∈ , and any 
Az∈ ,  
[ ]xyzxyz >><< or      zyRi⇒  if ( ) ( )AtAtz ji ∪∈  and zyPi  if ( ) ( )AtAtz ji ∪∉ . 
We observe that when we compare top-monotonicity with single-peakedness and single-
plateauedness we see that it represents a significant weakening of these conditions. Finally 
we can say that top-monotonicity satisfies MVT. 
In the following two examples we will see that single-peakedness and single-crossing do not 
satisfy simultaneously but both satisfy top-monotonicity. As single-crossing is equivalent to 
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order-restriction then single-crossing can be changed to order-restriction (Barbera and 
Moreno 2008). 
Example 2:  In this example we will see that the given preference profile satisfies single-
peakedness but not single-crossing. Let { }uzyxA ,,,=  and { }3 ,2 ,1=N . 
The preference relations being as follows: 
zPyPxPu   for individual 1, 
yPxPuPz   for individual 2, 
xPyPzPu   for individual 3. 
This preference profile can be expressed as in Figure 6. Individual 1’s peak is z, individual 
2’s peak is y, individual 3’s peak is x, relative to uxyz <<< . But the 
 
 
 
         
                 1P  
 
 
 
                          2P                                           
 
 
 
 
                                                                            3P  
 
             •                     •                     •                     •  
              z                      y                      x                      u 
                       Figure 6. Preference profile (Example 2). 
 
profile violates single-crossing relative to uxyz <<< , for any order P of the violation 
single-crossing. By the definition this example satisfies top-monotonicity relative to 
uxyz <<< . 
Example 3: In this example we will see that the given preference profile satisfies  
single-crossing but not single-peakedness. Let { } ,, zyxA =  and { } 3 ,2 ,1 =N .  
The preference relations being as follows: 
xPyPz   for individual 1, 
 xIyPz    for individual  2, 
 zPxIy    for individual  3. 
This preference profile can be expressed as in Figure 7. For 12 PP   we can write zyP2  and 
zyP1 , also for 23 PP   we can write yxI3  and zyP2 . So that preference profiles satisfy 
single-crossing on A, relative to zyx << . From Figure 7 we see that individuals 2 and 3 
have no single-peak or single-plateau. But according to the definition the preference profile 
this example satisfies top-monotonicity relative to zyx << . 
Example 4: (is given below) shows that top-monotonicity satisfies even the preference 
profile does not satisfy single-peakedness, single-crossing or single-plateau. 
Example 5: Let { } ,,, uzyxA =  and { } 3 ,2 ,1 =N . The preference relations being as follows: 
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                          3P  
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                       Figure 7. Preference profile (Example 3). 
xPyPzPu    for individual 1, 
 zPuPyPx    for individual 2, 
 uPzPxPy    for individual 3. 
This preference profile can be expressed as in Figure 8. Here individual 3 has no single-peak. 
If  123 PPP   then yxP1  and  xyP2  but yxP3 . If  132 PPP   
 
 
                     1P  
 
 
 
                              2P                                           
 
 
 
 
                                          3P  
 
 
              •                           •                           •                             •      
              x                           y                             z                                u 
Figure 8. Preference profile (Example 4). 
then uzP1  and  zuP3  but uzP2 . At last if 213 PPP   then yuP2 and uyP1  but yuP3 . Hence 
preference profile is not order-restricted and not single-crossing. But by the definition the 
preference profile is top-monotonic relative to uzyx <<< . 
Non-single-peakedness 
A preference profile is not single-peaked if for any linear ordering of alternatives there is 
always an agent for whom there is one alternative ordered between two preferred ones i.e., 
∉L  L ( ) NiPAi ∈∃⇒, , for Azyx ∈,,  such that x, y and z are consecutive in this order in L 
and ( )zyxly i ,,= . Therefore the MVT may not hold if voters do not have single-peaked 
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preferences. Then Condorcet cycle (Islam et al. 2011) must arise as a result the MVT must 
fail. In Figure 9 voter 2V  does not has single-peaked preference.  
The preference relations being as follows: 
xPyPz         for voter 1, 
xPzPy         for voter 2, 
zPyPx         for voter 3. 
               Utility                   
            
 
   
                                                                                                                         2V  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
                          1V  
                                          
 
                                                                                                        
                                                                                                          3V  
                                                                       
                                                                   
                                                    •                  •               •                                                                                                                                   
                   L                               x                  y                 z                                    R                   
                             Figure 9. Non-single-peaked preferences. 
 
The preferences satisfy a condition single-dipped preference and have an ordering. 
 
Comparison among Restrictions 
In the light of above discussion we see that single-crossing and single-peakedness are 
different assumptions. Both assumptions give us a result which is “the median  
voter’s ideal point is a Condorcet winner”. On the other hand both assumptions give different 
property i.e., single-crossing property implies the ideal point of the median voter and the 
single-peakedness property implies the median of the voters’ 
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                              3P  
 
                             2P  
 
                                          
 
             •                                 •                                 •               
              x                                  y                                   z                    
 
             Figure 10.  The preference profile has single-crossing but has no single-peak. 
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ideal points. Single-crossing assumption follows transitive ordering but does not follow the 
single-peakedness assumption. Single-peakedness and single-crossing appeared 
independently of each other in the economic literature, that they do not imply one another, 
and that each one results from its own underlying logic.  
 
Now we set an example to show the difference between single-crossing and single-
peakedness (Saporiti 2008). Consider the set of preference relations as follows: 
zyPxP 11      for individual 1, 
yzPxP 22     for individual 2, 
xyPzP 33     for individual 3 . 
We observe that this set has single-crossing property on { }zyxY ,,=  with respect to order-
restriction zyx <<  and the preference relation 123 PPP   (Figure 10). On the other hand, 
for every ordering of the alternatives, { }321 ,, PPP  violates the single-peaked property because, 
every alternative is ranked less preferred in one preference relation. 
 
LIMITATION OF THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL 
Although median voter model plays a pioneer role in election but it does not exist always. For 
example in the voting paradox (is given below) we have found no median voter.  
Now we discuss the Condorcet voting paradox in which there is no Condorcet winner 
(Condorcet 1785, Risse 2005). Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types and three 
alternatives x, y, z. Let preference relations being as follows: 
Type 1: xPyPz  by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPx  by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPy  by 4 voters. 
In an election a vote between x and y, candidate x collects 8 + 4 = 12 votes and y collects 5 
votes, so that x wins. Again a vote between y and z, candidate y collects 8 + 5 = 13 votes and 
z collects 4 votes, so that y wins. Again a vote between x and z, candidate x collects 8 votes 
and z collects 4 + 5 = 9 votes, so that z wins. We observe that there is a cycle in the voting 
results where x is defeated by y, and y is defeated by z, and also z is defeated by x, which is a 
voting paradox. 
The absence of median voter equilibrium may also arise in models where candidates can 
manipulate information and voter turnout. Indecision and chaos may create in such majority 
voting models. So that MVT is an important item in the democracy in all times.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper analyzes aspect of median voter theorem using some easier methods. We have 
shown that in median voter model there is a Condorcet winner, where there is no voting 
manipulation and the individuals sincerely declare their preferences. We have also shown that 
when there is no single-peak then we must face Condorcet voting paradox and MVT fails. So 
that median voter model can not solve all the problems of voting system but most of the cases 
the model is applicable. We have discussed that MVT can be applied not only in voting 
system but also in economics and social science. The paper is review of others’ works but we 
have tried throughout the paper to discuss median voter model with simple mathematical 
calculations, introducing definitions, and displaying diagrams where necessary. Voting 
system is a very complicated field but we have tried our best to make it easier. 
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